Economical Collapse

We actually see this happening every time there is an economic recession. People can no longer pay for various goods and services, and so have to rely on friends and neighbors instead. Where there is no money to facilitate transactions, gift economies reemerge and new kinds of money are created. Ordinarily, though, people and institutions fight tooth and nail to prevent that from happening. The habitual first response to economic crisis is to make and keep more money -- to accelerate the conversion of anything you can into money. On a systemic level, the debt surge is generating enormous pressure to extend the commodification of the commonwealth. We can see this happening with the calls to drill for oil in Alaska, commence deep-sea drilling, and so on. The time is here, though, for the reverse process to begin in earnest -- to remove things from the realm of goods and services, and return them to the realm of gifts, reciprocity, self-sufficiency, and community sharing. Note well: this is going to happen anyway in the wake of a currency collapse, as people lose their jobs or become too poor to buy things. People will help each other and real communities will reemerge.In the meantime, anything we do to protect some natural or social resource from conversion into money will both hasten the collapse and mitigate its severity. Any forest you save from development, any road you stop, any cooperative playgroup you establish; anyone you teach to heal themselves, or to build their own house, cook their own food, make their own clothes; any wealth you create or add to the public domain; anything you render off-limits to the world-devouring machine, will help shorten the Machine's lifespan. Think of it this way: if you already do not depend on money for some portion of life's necessities and pleasures, then the collapse of money will pose much less of a harsh transition for you. The same applies to the social level. Any network or community or social institution that is not a vehicle for the conversion of life into money will sustain and enrich life after money.

The Collapse

The Collapse of the Thai Baht in 1997 , however, it was clear that the boom had produced excess capacity in residential and commercial property. An estimated 365,000 apartment units were unoccupied in Bangkok in late 1996. With another 100,000 units scheduled to be completed in 1997, yearsof excess demand in the Thai property market had been replaced by excess supply. By one estimate, Bangkok’s building boom by 1997 had produced enough excess space to meet its residential and commercial needs for at least five years. At the same time, Thailand’s investments in infrastructure, industrial capacity, and commercial real estate were sucking in foreigngoods at unprecedented rates. To build infrastructure, factories, and office buildings, Thailand was purchasing capital equipment and materials from America, Europe, and Japan. As a consequence, the current account of the balance of payments shifted strongly into the red during the mid 1990s. Despite strong export growth, imports grew faster.By 1995, Thailand was running a current account deficit equivalent to 8.1 percent of its GDP.
Things started to fall apart February 5, 1997, when Somprasong Land, a Thai property developer, announced it had failed to make a scheduled $3.1 million
During the 1980s and 1990s, Thailand emerged as one of Asia’s most dynamic tiger economies. From 1985 to 1995, Thailand achieved an annual average economic growth rate of 8.4 percent, while keeping its annual inflation rate at only 5 percent (comparable figures for the United States over this period were 1.3 percent for economic growth and 3.2 percent for inflation). Much of Thailand’s economic growth was powered by exports. From 1990 to 1996, for example, the value of exports from Thailand grew by 16 percent per year compounded. The wealth created by export-led growth fueled an investment boom in commercial and residential property, industrial assets, and infrastructure. As demand for property increased, the value of commercial and residential real estate in Bangkok soared. This fed a building boom the likes of which had never been seen in Thailand. Office and apartment buildings were going up all over the city. Heavy borrowing from banks financed much of this construction, but as long as property values continued to rise, the banks were happy to lend to property companies.
Value of the baht against the dollar. In this context, short selling involves a currency trader borrowing bath from a financial institution and immediately reselling those baht in the foreign exchange market for dollars. The theory is that if the value of the baht subsequently falls against the dollar, then when the trader has to buy the baht back to repay the financial institution, it will cost her fewer dollars than she received from the initial sale of baht. For example, a trader might borrow Bt100 from a bank for six months. The trader then exchanges the Bt100 for $4 (at an exchange rate of $1 Bt25). If the exchange rate subsequently declines to $1 Bt50, it will cost the trader only $2 to repurchase the Bt100 in
six months and pay back the bank, leaving the trader with a 100 percent profit!
In May 1997, short sellers were swarming over the Thai baht. In an attempt to defend the peg, the Thai government used its foreign exchange reserves (which
were denominated in U.S. dollars) to purchase baht. It cost the Thai government $5 billion to defend the baht, which reduced its “officially reported” foreign exchange reserves to a two-year low of $33 billion. In addition, the Thai government raised key interest rates from 10 percent to 12.5 percent to make holding bath more attractive, but because this also raised corporate borrowing costs it exacerbated the debt crisis. What the world financial community did not know at this point, was that with the blessing of his superiors, a foreign exchange trader at the Thai central bank had locked up most of Thailand’s foreign exchange reserves in forward contracts. The reality was that Thailand had only $1.14 billion in available foreign exchange reserves left to defend the dollar peg. Defending the peg was now impossible. On July 2, 1997, the Thai government bowed to the inevitable and announced it would allow the both to float freely against the dollar. The both immediately lost 18 percent of its value and started a slide that would bring the exchange rate down to $1 Bt55 by January 1998. As the both declined, the Thai debt bomb exploded. A 50 percent decline in the value of the both against the dollar doubled the amount of both required to serve the dollar-denominated debt commitments taken on by Thai financial institutions and businesses.
This made more bankruptcies and further pushed down the battered Thai stock market. The Thailand Set stock market index ultimately declined from 787 in January 1997 to a low of 337 in December of that year, and this on top of a 45 percent decline in 1996! Sources: “Bitter Pill for the Thais,” Straits Times, July 5, 1997, p. 46;
World Bank, 1997 World Development Report (New York: World Bank, 1997), Table 2; T. Bardacke, “Somprasong Defaults on $80 Million Eurobond,” Financial Times, February 6, 1997, p. 25; and T. Bardacke, “The Day the Miracle Came to an End,” Financial Times, January 12, 1998, pp. 6–7. interest payment on an $80 billion eurobond loan, effectively entering into default. Somprasong Land was the
first victim of speculative overbuilding in the Bangkok property market. The Thai stock market had already declined by 45 percent since its high in early 1996, primarily on concerns that several property companies might be forced into bankruptcy. Now one had been. The stock market fell another 2.7 percent on the news, but it was only the beginning. In the aftermath of Somprasong’s default, it became clear that, along with several other property developers, many of the country’s financial institutions, including Finance One, were also on the brink of default. Finance One, the country’s largest financial institution, had pioneered a practice that had become widespread among Thai institutions—issuing bonds denominated in U.S. dollars and using the proceeds to finance lending to the country’s booming property developers. In theory, this practice made sense because Finance One was able to exploit the interest rate differential between dollar-denominated debt and Thai debt (i.e., Finance One borrowed in U.S. dollars at a low interest rate and lent in Thai baht at high interest rates). The only problem with this financing strategy was that when the Thai property market began to unravel in 1996 and 1997, the property developers could no longer pay
back the cash they had borrowed from Finance One. This made it difficult for Finance One to pay back its creditors. As the effects of overbuilding became evident in 1996, Finance One’s nonperforming loans doubled, Then doubled again in the first quarter of 1997.
In February 1997, trading in the shares of Finance One was suspended while the government tried to arrange for the troubled company to be acquired by a small Thai bank in a deal sponsored by the Thai central bank. It didn’t work, and when trading resumed in Finance One shares in May, they fell 70 percent in a single day. By this time bad loans in the Thai property market were swelling daily and had risen to more than $30 billion. Finance One was bankrupt, and it was feared that others would follow. It was at this point that currency traders began a concerted attack on the Thai currency. For the previous 13 years, the Thai baht had been pegged to the U.S. dollar at an exchange rate of about $1 Bt25. This peg,
however, had become increasingly difficult to defend. Currency traders, looking at Thailand’s growing current account deficit and dollar-denominated debt burden, reasoned that demand for dollars in Thailand would rise while demand for baht would fall. (Businesses and financial institutions would be exchanging
baht for dollars to service their debt payments and purchase imports.) There were several attempts to force a devaluation of the baht in late 1996 and early 1997.
These speculative attacks typically involved traders selling baht short to profit from a future decline in the

AXIS EURO

In 1999 when the European Union introduced the euro, Michael Jones, owner and CEO of Axis Ltd., a small manufacturer of wiring components for the aerospace industry, thought it would be a good idea to start pricing sales
To European customers in euros (m). During late 1998, Axis entered into multiyear deals with two European aerospace companies to supply wiring. The prices were calculated using an exchange rate of $1 m1.18, which was
just a little stronger than the exchange rate for the euro at the time of its introduction in January 1999. As Jones later noted: “Stupid us! At the time the euro was introduced, no one thought its value would immediately plunge against the dollar. We thought the currency would trade in a narrow range against the dollar, and that pricing in euros was in the best interests of our European
customers.” However, the euro promptly fell against the dollar, bottoming out at nearly $1 m0.82 in October 2000.
For Axis, the plunge was devastating. One of the contracts called for Axis to supply m5 million of wiring to a European customer in 2000. Axis had hoped to generate $5.9 million in revenue at an exchange rate of $1 m1.18
(m5 million 1.18
$5.9 million). The company knew that as long as the euro stayed over $1 m1.05 it would be able to make a decent profit on the deal. However,
when payment was due, the exchange rate stood at $1 m0.88, and the m5 million deal netted Axis only $4.4 million in revenues. Axis lost money that year due to the adverse movement in foreign exchange rates. The com-
pany’s 10 top managers all took 20 percent pay cuts, there were no profit-sharing bonuses, and no other employees got a raise.
To make sure that didn’t happen again, Jones began to actively hedge against adverse currency movements in 2000. To do this, Axis entered the foreign exchange market, buying currency forward (that is, entering a contract
today to buy currency at some point in the future at a predetermined exchange rate). For example, in late 2000,
Axis entered a contract to supply wire to a European customer in the first half of 2001, with payment due in June 2001. The total value of the contract was m2.5 million. At the time, the prevailing dollar/ euro exchange rate was $1 m0.90, so the contract would generate $2.25 million in revenues for Axis (m2.5 million 0.9 $2.25 million).
To protect this projected revenue stream from adverse movement in the exchange rate, Axis entered into a forward contract with the foreign exchange desk of its bank to change euros into dollars on July 1, 2001. The bank
quoted Axis a rate of $1 m0.94 for making the exchange on that date, which would guarantee Axis $2.35 million.
The higher forward rate offered by the bank reflected the view of the foreign exchange market that the euro would appreciate a little against the dollar over the next year.
To Jones, this seemed like a good deal and he entered the contract. But on July 1, the exchange rate stood at $1 m0.85. The foreign exchange market was wrong, and the euro had depreciated against the dollar. Had Axis not
entered into the forward exchange contract, its m2.5 million in revenues would have been worth only $2.125 million, not the $2.35 million Axis actually received by executing the forward contract. “It doesn’t always work in our favor though,” notes Jones. “In 2002, we entered another forward contract to supply wiring through till early 2003. We hedged the exchange rate risk by buying dollars
forward on the market at $1 m0.95, which was the forward rate at the time. But guess what! In March 2003, when the customer had to pay, the exchange rate stood at $1 m1.07. Had we not hedged, we would have made a tidy sum on the appreciation in the value of the euro against the dollar, but I cannot stomach the risk associated with that type of speculation anymore. I would rather
know what I am getting.”